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Abstract  
 
This paper aims to explain significant policy change in the context of highly change-resistant welfare 
states. Dominant institutional theories of welfare state politics predict that welfare states are extremely 
stable constructs. Despite such claims, the German welfare state, being the prototype of such stability, 
has undergone a number of structural reforms in recent years. I argue that ideational leadership (IL) is 
able to account for such reforms in status-quo oriented welfare states by changing preferences of 
actors who formerly opposed far-reaching reforms and breaking through institutional lock-in 
mechanisms. Evidence from a comparative case study of German welfare state reforms shows that 
policy-makers indeed displayed ideational leadership, while they also made concessions to overcome 
political-institutional obstacles. The findings suggest that the politics of transforming welfare states 
differs from the politics of retrenching welfare states. Furthermore, the concepts introduced enhance 
current theorizing on policy change with regard to both assessing change and explaining it.   
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
Patterns of policy stability and change have engaged analysts in political studies and policy sciences 
alike for several decades. In particular, analysts are interested in improving knowledge on what 
constitutes policy change and how “real” change can be distinguished from “minor” change or policy 
adjustments. A second major question is what determines policy change and major change in 
particular, and by what mechanisms explanatory factors are linked to policy outcomes. This paper asks 
both kinds of questions while taking issue with a puzzle in the area of comparative welfare state 
research. The puzzle concerns a contradiction between theoretical knowledge and empirical 
observations. Dominant institutional theories of welfare state politics tell us that fundamental welfare 
state reforms are unlikely to occur. Notwithstanding their predictions, the notoriously stable German 
welfare state has undergone a number of major reforms in recent years. How is this possible? 
Departing from the main drawbacks of historical institutionalist approaches, I argue that 
ideational leadership (IL) can explain major reforms, defined as structural reforms, in status quo- 
oriented welfare states. Ideational leaders tackle institutional obstacles by changing preferences of 
actors who formerly opposed far-reaching reforms; by doing so, they are able to open up institutional 
lock-in mechanisms. To evaluate this hypothesis, a comparative case study of German welfare state 
reforms was carried out, investigating four reform processes in considerable detail. The empirical 
evidence showed that policy-makers indeed displayed ideational leadership, while they also made 
concessions to overcome political-institutional obstacles. As for the conditions and assumptions 
underlying welfare state reform, the findings suggest that the politics of transforming welfare states 
surely differs from the politics of retrenching welfare states. Furthermore, they enhance both the 
dependent and independent variable dimensions of theorizing on policy change.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the arguments of two protagonists of 
dominant approaches (Esping-Andersen, Pierson) as well as a critique of their theories. Furthermore, it 
argues that a number of advanced welfare states, including Germany, have recently undergone a 
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number of major reforms. In order to capture such non-incremental change theoretically, I propose the 
concept of “structural reform”. Section 2 proceeds to formulate a theoretical explanation of structural 
reform, arguing that “ideational leadership” (IL) is able to account for them. IL is based on two 
explanatory variables of policy change, political agency and political ideas. The underlying 
assumption is that IL changes preferences of actors opposing far-reaching reforms. The following 
section reports on how the IL hypothesis was operationalised and summarizes the findings of a 
comparative case study of reform processes in three major areas of the German welfare state: old-age 
pensions, unemployment insurance and health care (Section 3). Section 4 discusses the empirical 
findings, considers their implications for welfare state theories. The conclusion briefly reflects on the 
importance of the findings for studying policy change, also beyond the area of social policy.   
 
 
1. Highly Change Resistant Welfare States Versus Major Policy Change  
 
1.1 Theories Predicting Change Resistance  
Firstly, Gøsta Esping-Andersen has contributed a widely used classification to comparative welfare 
state research (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996). In his seminal book The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990), he distinguishes three clusters of welfare state regimes, a Social-Democratic, a 
Liberal and a Conservative type.1 What are the prospects for policy change given those regimes? Due 
to their shared institutional characteristics, future policy trajectories are regime-specific, which means 
that policy change is likely to remain within a regime’s policy path. Moreover, successful reform 
adoption is dependent upon a broad consensus among various social interests (Esping-Andersen 1996: 
266-267), which is needed to overcome a regime’s inherent resistance against change. Despite clear 
changes in the context of social policy making and politicians’ efforts to adapt welfare states to new 
challenges, at the end of the 1990’s, Esping-Andersen still held that ‘the inherent logic of our three 
welfare state regimes seems to reproduce itself’ (Esping-Andersen, 1999:165).  
As the second important theorist of historical institutionalism, Paul Pierson has identified 
three sorts of constraints to radical welfare state reform relevant to policy-makers wishing to pursue 
retrenchment (Pierson 1994; 1996). Firstly, advanced welfare states, after decades of expansion, 
constitute the status quo, ‘…with all the political advantages that this status confers. Non-decisions 
generally favour the welfare state’ (Pierson 1996: 174). Secondly, radical welfare state reform faces 
electoral hazards. Such reform is politically risky because social policy programmes continue to enjoy 
widespread popularity among the electorate at large. In addition, the maturation of these programmes 
                                                
1
 Regimes differ with regard to the mix of institutions guaranteeing the provision of social security: the state, the market and 
the family. Secondly, they vary with respect to the kind of stratification systems upheld by these institutions (regarding, for 
instance, the extent of status differentiation and inequality that is accepted). Finally, the degree of de-commodification, i.e. to 
what extent people can make a living without having to rely on labor market participation, varies across these regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 37).  
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has created new interests, i.e. producers and consumers of social services, acting as their defenders. 
“New politics” assumes welfare state retrenchment to be inherently unpopular with the electorate, 
forcing politicians to resort to blame-avoidance strategies. Finally, Pierson argues that the creation of 
policy programmes in the past has engendered path-dependent processes:  
Organizations and individuals adapt to particular arrangements, making commitments that may render 
the costs of change (even to some potentially more efficient alternative) far higher than the costs of 
continuity. Existing commitments lock in policymakers (Pierson 1996: 175).2  
 
The technical consequences of path-dependence are effects such as policy lock-in and sticky 
institutions (Van Kersbergen 2000: 23), which are claimed to limit substantially the reform options 
available to policy makers. As a consequence, path-breaking change is practically ruled out allowing 
at best “bounded change”, that is within the limits of a previously chosen path (Pierson 2001: 415).  
Under these circumstances, what are the prospects for major change? Pierson specifies four “tentative 
hypotheses” for significant reform, according to which retrenchment will be facilitated by electoral 
slack, budgetary crises, strong chances for reducing the visibility of reform, and good prospects for 
changing the rules of the game, or “institutional shifts” (Pierson 1996: 176-178). However, the value 
of these hypotheses is doubtful: the outcome of reform is only specified vaguely; the linkages between 
the factors are unclear; and the factors specify contextual conditions rather than clarifying what policy-
makers should do to achieve reforms. All in all, Pierson’s theory does at best speculate about 
conditions of path-breaking change, while seeing the continuation of the status quo as the most likely 
outcome.3  
 
1.2 Criticism of Institutionalist Approaches 
The theorizing of Esping-Andersen and Pierson suffers from two weaknesses. The first relates to their 
greatest strength: they are very well equipped to explain the relative stability of welfare states. 
However, the downside is that by overemphasizing the weight of institutions as obstacles to far-
reaching change, they leave open few possibilities for such change. Their accounts give little thought 
to the conditions of significant change and possibilities for leaving historically determined paths of 
welfare provision are portrayed as severely limited. As a result, their message is that reforms going 
beyond established policy patterns and regime characteristics can only occur under very narrowly 
defined circumstances. This stability bias deflects attention from actual patterns of change, including 
reforms which imply divergence from an existing policy path.  
The second weakness is the lack of attention paid to the role of political agency (Ross 2000a). 
Policy makers do make an appearance in these theories, but their scope for tackling significant 
                                                
2
 More precisely, research on technological change indicates that ‘increasing returns’ are based on large set-up or fixed cost, 
learning effects, coordination effects and actors’ adaptive expectations. For a more detailed treatment of the concept of path-
dependence, its origins in the literature on technological change and its application to political science, see Pierson 2000.   
3
 Admittedly, the conclusion to his edited 2001 volume (Pierson 2001) goes one step further in specifying the conditions of 
change by hypothesizing about different reform paths for different welfare regimes. However, this text does not build upon 
his 1996 “preconditions for significant change”, but starts from a ‘broad reform consensus’ assumption and is essentially still 
historical-institutionalist in orientation.   
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restructuring is portrayed as severely limited. For instance, Pierson has stressed the contrast between 
the “Golden Era” of welfare state enlargement and the current “era of austerity”: now, leaders find 
themselves squeezed between external pressures and internal constraints (Pierson 2001). While 
Pierson points to a number of factors that might offer politicians opportunities for radical change, 
including blame-avoidance strategies, Esping-Andersen remains even more pessimistic about the 
capacity of political agency, when he sees reform only in rare instances of broad social and political 
consensus. In his view, ‘the alignment of political forces conspires just about everywhere to maintain 
the existing principles of the welfare state’ (Esping-Andersen 1996: 265).   
In a nutshell, dominant approaches of welfare state regimes and their politics display a strong 
continuity bias that entails the risk of overlooking empirical developments of significant welfare state 
reform. Furthermore, they underestimate the potential of political agency as a possible motor behind 
such reforms.  
 
1.3 Major Reforms Do Occur  
However, it is doubtful whether the account of welfare states stability is still accurate at the beginning 
of the 21st century. Indeed, recent empirical developments tell a different story. Despite contrary 
theoretical predictions, advanced welfare states have seen major reforms in recent years. As for the 
Social-Democratic welfare states, Sweden carried out an important pension reform in the early 1990s 
(Anderson 1998; Anderson and Meyer 2003; Lindbom and Rothstein 2004); Denmark restructured its 
pension arrangements (Andersen and Larsen 2002) and made the transition to a ‘workfare’ type of 
labour market policies (Torfing 1999; Cox 2001); and Norway’s health care system experienced some 
important decentralizing reforms (Hagen and Kaarbøe 2006). Liberal welfare states that have 
undergone some major reforms are the United Kingdom (Clasen 2005; Clasen 2005b), New Zealand, 
Australia (Boston, Dalziel and St John 1999; Goldfinch and 't Hart 2003), and, to some extent, the 
United States (Hacker 2002; Hacker 2004). In the Conservative or Continental regimes, the 
Netherlands adopted activating social policies in a formerly passive welfare state (Hemerijck and Van 
Kersbergen 1997), and, in 2006, adopted system shifts in health and disability insurance. In France, 
unemployment insurance as well as the financing base of social contributions have been reformed 
significantly (Palier 2000; Vail 2004). Italy tackled its pension insurance before participating in EMU 
in 1996 (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000; Ferrera and Gualmini 2004) and a noteworthy pension reform 
was passed in Austria (Busemeyer 2005). Even in Germany, analysts have noted examples of path-
diverging reforms and signs of transformation in the areas of pensions, unemployment insurance, 
long-term care insurance and, to some extent, health care (Bönker and Wollmann 2000; Czada 2005; 
Schmidt 2005).  
In this paper, for several reasons the focus lies on Germany. Germany is an intriguing case for 
investigating how significant reforms occur due to its peculiar combination of reform obstacles, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, salient reform pressures. Obstacles to reform are associated with its 
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particular political and welfare state institutions. The former make for a large number of veto points 
and veto players, and, in terms of its welfare state make-up, Germany is considered the prototype of 
the Conservative regime facing formidable obstacles, when adjusting to economic problems (Esping-
Andersen 1996; Hemerijck, Manow and Van Kersbergen 2000; Scharpf 2000a). Furthermore, the 
country is confronted with reform pressures from multiple sources, socioeconomic, fiscal and 
demographic, all of which have intensified in the wake of unification. All of these factors combine in a 
perplexing mix of institutional obstacles, on the one hand, and large incentives to tackle reforms, on 
the other. Against this background, a number of theoretically unexpected major reforms have occurred 
starting in the 1990’s.  
 
1.4 Defining Major Policy Change as Structural Reform 
Describing policy change in the domain of the welfare state is no easy task. One reason why a great 
deal of the existing welfare state literature is hardly comparable is the lack of generally accepted 
definitions of welfare state reform. The proliferation of labels for gradations of change (“incremental”, 
“far-reaching”, “major”, “path-breaking” etc.) is compounded by the so-called “dependent variable 
problem”. Since it was first attested as relating to the conceptualization and operationalization of 
retrenchment (Green-Pedersen 2004), it has since been described as a broader problem. The authors of 
a recent agenda for systematically addressing the problem note that it includes disagreements about the 
nature and scale of welfare state change, its conceptualization and measurement, and even how policy 
outcomes can be accounted for by causal factors (Clasen and Siegel 2005: 2). In the literature, 
approaches to welfare state change, relying on quantitative and qualitative conceptualizations, abound. 
Main types of indicators to capture (changes in) welfare effort are social expenditure data (e.g. social 
spending in percentage of GDP), social rights indicators (e.g. measures of ‘decommodification’), and 
institutional characteristics. Studies that apply qualitative typologies of change (Hemerijck and Van 
Kersbergen 1997; Leitner and Lessenich 2003; Schmid 2003; Clasen and Clegg 2005) tend to draw 
upon more general models of policy change (Hall 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hay 2001) 
that have been adapted to a welfare state context. 4 The approach taken in this paper also captures 
major welfare state change in qualitative terms, with the concept of “structural reform” referring to 
shifts in the institutional set-up of policies. Such shifts differ from incremental changes, which can 
frequently be expressed in quantitative terms, for instance, changes in benefit levels or the calculation 
of benefits. In other words, they are distinct from the kind of routine adjustments historical 
institutionalism or regime theory would allow for.5  
                                                
4
 Taylor-Gooby notes that while the outcomes of quantitative analyses tend to stress stability and resilience to pressures, in 
case studies of policy-making processes are more likely to detect ‘current changes in political alignments and in the 
institutional framework of policy-making which may be opening the way to substantial restructuring’ (Taylor-Gooby 2002: 
598). Statistical analyses tend to lead to an emphasis on continuity because they are necessarily based on data which covers a 
period stretching back into the past, whereas case studies ‘provide a greater opportunity to examine factors that are currently 
significant and thus direct attention to forces making for change’(Ibid.).   
5
 As a matter of fact, Pierson and Esping-Andersen do implicitly concede that even in welfare state regimes that are 
notoriously resistant to change and under conditions of institutional resilience and a political climate of austerity, some 
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To define structural reform, I drew on a number of existing qualitative definitions of welfare 
state change (Webber 1989; Bonoli and Palier 2000a). Webber, in his study of health care reform, 
described structural reforms as ‘purposeful state interventions which effected a structural change of 
the health care system’ and ‘a re-ordering of competences and responsibilities regarding financing, 
provision, and regulation of medical services’ (Webber 1989: 263-264; own translation). Bonoli and 
Palier distinguished four institutional dimensions of social policy programmes, a) the mode of access 
to benefits, b) its benefit structure, c) its financing mechanisms, and, finally, d) the actors who manage 
the system (Bonoli and Palier 2000b; Palier 2002). Their classification covers the main structures 
found in any welfare state programme and complements Webber’s definition that is more geared to the 
service-based health sector. For reasons of parsimony (and keeping in mind that it is difficult to 
disentangle them empirically), I subsumed Bonoli and Palier’s mode of access under benefit structure.   
Accordingly, structural reform was defined as reforms producing shifts in either the financing 
structure, the benefit structure (rules of eligibility and form of provision), or the management or 
regulatory structure of any social policy programme or policy.6  
Using this definition, it is possible to take a closer look at seemingly major reforms and check 
whether they have actually entailed structural shifts in some or all of a policy’s dimensions. In this 
fashion, I was able to identify reforms in Germany that would lend themselves for more detailed 
analysis in the case studies. For instance, the 2001 pension reform introduced shifts in all three 
dimensions, and the same goes for the 2003/2004 merger of unemployment and social assistance.    
 
 
 
2. A Novel Driver of Change: Ideational Leadership  
 
Commonplace explanations of far-reaching policy change deal with economic, political-institutional, 
party-political and ideational factors. It can be shown that each of them, when considered separately, 
cannot satisfactorily account for major reforms in the German context.  
                                                                                                                                                   
reforms remain likely. Pierson, for instance, concludes his 1996 study of the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, 
and Sweden by arguing that ‘over the span of two decades, however, some changes in social policy are inevitable (…) What 
is striking is how hard it is to find radical changes in advanced welfare states’ (Pierson 1996: 174). 
6
 The financing structure may be based on taxation, on employment-related contributions or on (insurance) premiums. A 
switch from a premium-financed health insurance to a national health care system based on general taxation would be a 
structural shift, while the mere downward or upward adjustment of contribution rates for the insured would be an incremental 
change. Secondly, a programme’s benefit structure may include means-tested, flat-rate, earnings-related or contribution-
related benefits. Changes from one mode to another, for instance, from a contribution-financed to a means-tested system of 
unemployment insurance, I consider structural shifts. Similarly, concerning health care, the addition of a new group of health 
care providers would constitute such a change. Conversely, cuts in benefit allowances or the closing down of certain types of 
hospitals (as health care providers) would be incremental changes. Finally, the regulation or management structure of a 
policy may be comprised of different actors, such as the state, the social partners (usually trade unions and employers’ 
associations) and private actors. If, in pension policy, trade unions get a say in the regulation of (public) pension funds, or, in 
health care policy, a greater number of actors would start deciding about the level of doctors’ enumerations, and this again 
would constitute structural shifts. Conversely, if a change of regulation in such programmes leaves the existing distribution of 
competences intact, the change is merely incremental.  
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Economic explanations run into trouble as mounting economic and fiscal strain, especially 
after unification, have not readily translated into far-reaching reforms. German political institutions 
make for many veto players (Tsebelis 1995), and potentially form a steady defence of the social policy 
status quo. Party-political factors, for instance, the country’s party system with its inbuilt electoral 
competition on social issues, also tend to make radical reforms difficult (Kitschelt 2001). Likewise, it 
is questionable whether far-reaching reforms can be explained solely by parties’ credit-claiming 
strategies (Levy 1999) or the advantages party’s have from particular issue associations (Ross 2000c). 
Finally, recent studies using ideational factors, that is, of reform-facilitating discourses (Cox 2001; 
Schmidt 2002b) found no evidence for them in the period up to 2001, and the conditions for effective 
framing based on a case study of the United Kingdom (Ross 2000a) would first have to be applied to 
German reforms.  
This leads to the conclusion that such macro- (i.e. regime- or country level) and meso-level 
(i.e. policy programme level) explanatory factors - in the German context – seem to be better suited to 
explain stability than major change. Therefore, the solution to the puzzle sketched above may lie in 
explanations situated at the micro-level of analysis. For such micro-level explanations, one needs to 
take political agency into consideration, i.e. individual policy makers and their patterns of 
communication and behaviour. How should one go about this? Existing approaches to leadership that 
consider the effects of political agency on policy outcomes often poorly specify why politicians are in 
favour of change and how they achieve it (e.g. Luke 2000). Conversely, idea-based explanations may 
just offer those clues to the motives and strategies used by political agents, while they also have 
drawbacks. Specifically, they often neglect to specify causal mechanisms that connect ideas with 
policy change, and lack attention to how ideas rise to prominence, for instance through political 
agency (Ross 2000b; Schmidt 2002b). In my view, by developing a “joint concept”, ideational 
leadership (IL), from the two literatures, it is possible to compensate these weaknesses by combining 
the strengths of these approaches. IL has been devised after reviewing relevant concepts in the 
leadership (Burns 1978; Blondel 1987; Moon 1995; 't Hart 2000; Luke 2000; Goldfinch and 't Hart 
2003) and ideational literatures related to policy change (Braun 1999; Ross 2000a; Schmidt 2002a; 
Schmidt 2002b). From these concepts, leadership-related tasks that enable reform as well as elements 
clarifying the role played by ideas in substantial policy change were selected. The resulting hypothesis 
on IL specifies that key politicians achieve structural reforms by showing certain communicative and 
behavioural patterns. Key politicians are considered to be ministers who typically come forward with 
such proposals and have the formal authority to do so. IL is made up of the following aspects 
expressing those patterns:  
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualisation of Ideational Leadership (IL) 
 
Two types of causal mechanisms link these aspects with the outcome of structural reform. The first 
one operates at the level of beliefs (both cognitive and normative) of opposing actors and the level of 
(ideal) interests. This ideational mechanism changes cognitive and normative preferences of reform-
resisting actors, and relates to Heclo’s concept of “puzzling”(Heclo 1974: 305-306). The second one 
relates to the interests of a such actors and changes how they perceive them, which is reminiscent of 
the notion of “powering within puzzling”(Ferrera and Gualmini 2004): policy actors who try to 
organise consensus around preferred policy solutions are also influenced by political considerations. 
The two mechanisms are supported by the assumption about the orientation of IL-type actors: it 
assumes that they are predominantly policy-oriented, which contrasts with the more conventional view 
of policy-makers being power-oriented or office-seeking. Such policy-orientation is equally assumed 
to help with changing the preferences of opposed actors.  
 
Figure 2: Four causal mechanisms linking the aspects of ideational leadership with the outcome of 
structural reform  
 
The combination of these mechanisms (effecting changes in beliefs, norms, and ideal interests of 
opposing actors or policy stakeholders), creates favourable circumstances for an institutional “break-
out”(cf. Woerdman 2002). In other words, the policy lock-in of the status quo, which is responsible for  
Aspects making up ideational leadership (IL)   
Communicative/behavioural aspects 
1) Exposing the drawbacks of the policy status quo  
2) Making contant efforts to legitimize (the principles of) new policy  
3) Engaging with reform opponents by framing their resistance as “problematic”  
4) Making efforts at political consensus-building to muster support for a 
particular reform initiative  
 
Orientation/motivation aspect  
5) Being policy- rather than power-oriented  
 
Ideational mechanisms 
1) policy failure or loss of effectiveness brings on the search for alternatives  
2) creating insights into the logics of appropriateness and necessity behind the 
innovation helps to lower switching costs and re-define values underlying old policy 
and institutions 
 
Interest-related mechanisms 
3) reform-critical interest groups that are made to “face the facts” or redefine (the 
perception) of their interests lower switching costs  
4) forging consensus based on policy-seeking and not power-seeking motives reduces 
switching costs  
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institutional resilience, is overcome and opens the way for structural reform: a re-ordering of actors’ 
competences and responsibilities in a given social policy programme.  
Essentially, IL breaks with traditional thinking about leadership as a power-related concept. 
Instead of holding that formal sources of authority are important to achieve reforms, it stresses that a 
reform-minded leader possesses the will to innovate as well as persuasive skills. IL thus extends the 
meaning of leadership in the context of policy-making and addresses a gap in welfare state research:  it 
specifies how policy ideas, vested interests and political institutions interact during different stages of 
the policy process (Béland 2005: 15).  
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence from German Welfare State Reform  
 
3.1 Research Design and Methodology 
The IL hypothesis was evaluated in a small-n comparative case study of three social policy areas, 
which suited two requirements: being able to trace IL empirically, and evaluating its linkages with 
reform outcomes in a complex empirical context. Germany formed the context of analysis, and the 
case studies focussed on individual reform processes as object of investigation. Within the cases, I 
applied the process-tracing technique, and used two alternative explanations to overcome reform 
obstacles as additional tools for evaluating the IL hypothesis.7 The main empirical question guiding 
the case study analyses was twofold: To what extent it is possible to observe IL in the reform 
processes leading up to reform adoption and in what ways does it relate to the adoption of structural 
reform? To operationalize IL, each of its aspects was translated into approximate textual “indicators” 
that could be used to carry out systematic analyses of data sources aimed at detecting the presence of 
IL. Likewise, structural reform was operationalised as to allow case selection in accordance with my 
theoretical criteria of substantial reform.  
Within the overall case study design, each of the cases had a different function assigned to it. 
The first case study served primarily as a plausibility probe, that is, to check whether evidence of IL 
could be found at all in a case of structural reform. The second case study was carried out to see if the 
conclusions from the first case about the plausibility of IL would hold in another case with an outcome 
                                                
7
 Alternative explanations imply that a certain outcome is the result of other influences than the one(s) hypothesized. By 
collecting information about those other influences, hypothesized explanations can become potentially stronger by excluding 
other plausible explanatory factors or alternative explanations. Drawing on Burns volume on leadership (1975), I specified 
two sorts of alternative explanations operating on the level of individual actors. He considered a number of possible strategies 
to overcome resistance to change, including coercive, normative, utilitarian, empirical-rational, power-coercive, and re-
educative strategies  Based on Burns’ list, I chose two plausible strategies key politicians might utilize: The first one involves 
that they try to ignore or outmanoeuvre reform critics (both in parliament and outside). In short, this strategy sees politicians 
at a minimum refusing to engage with reform criticism and at a maximum trying to adjust the institutional context in which 
they operate t in order to push through their preferred policy adjustments. This explanation reflects the use of political power. 
The second alternative explanation states that key policy-makers make concessions in order to push through reforms. The 
promise of some form of pay-off, i.e. financial benefits or other compensation for societal groups and/or political veto players 
may be another way to calm opposition and get reforms adopted.  Theoretically, these two power- and exchange-related 
explanations can be distinguished from the IL hypothesis, which draws attention to processes of persuading critics and 
getting consensus for reforms.  
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of structural reform, and to make visible the effects of IL on reform adoption. Both cases were 
selected on the dependent variable, structural reform. The third and final case, selected on the 
independent variable, IL, served to assess whether there was also a reverse relationship between the 
two variables. In other words, would a selected “presumed” ideational leader also accomplish 
structural reforms while in office?  
For collecting empirical evidence, the case studies relied on a triangulation of sources: policy-
related documents; speeches and press interviews of key policy-makers; thirty-five expert interviews; 
and daily and weekly quality press coverage. The process of collecting data and conducting interviews 
in the three policy sectors took place between May 2004 and February 2006. Subsequently, a 
qualitative content analysis was performed on the written material as well as on interview transcripts, 
applying the indicators for IL as well as indicators for the occurrence of alternative explanations, in 
order to gauge the presence and effectiveness of ideational leadership.  
3.2 Case Study Findings  
 
To corroborate the hypothesis, IL needed to be identified in the two cases selected on the outcome of 
structural reform. In addition, a connection between IL and structural reform had to be demonstrated, 
preferably along the lines of the causal mechanisms outlined earlier. Conversely, if ministers did not 
meet the criteria of IL, or if they met the criteria, but if a link to the reform outcome could not be 
established, the hypothesis would be rejected. In the case analyses outlined below, both lines of 
evaluation were followed, establishing first the characteristics of the key politicians under 
investigation, and then gathering evidence of their efforts to realize structural reform. 
 
Old-age Pensions   
The first case study analysed the process preceding the 2001 pension reform, named after Minister of 
Labour, Walter Riester. This significant piece of legislation ended the de facto one-pillar structure of 
German pension arrangements, introduced a privately financed and state-subsidised element, and 
strengthened the company-based element of pension provision. I considered this reform to be 
structural in character due to the changes it introduced to financing, benefits, and the regulation of 
pension arrangements. In response to the Minister’s initial reform proposal, considerable opposition, 
both parliamentary and societal, had gathered against it, and needed to be addressed by the reformist 
camp headed by the Minister. Despite repeated changes to the proposal, and various concessions on 
the part of the Ministry to its critics (including opponents within the Social Democrats, the opposition 
Christian Democrats, and major trade unions); Minister Riester nevertheless preserved the core 
innovations of the reform until its adoption in the spring of 2001. The evidence collected confirmed 
that the Minister acted in accordance with IL on the basis of the concept’s three core aspects, 
“rejecting the policy status quo”, “legitimizing new policy proposals” and “appealing to critics to 
rethink their resistance”. In addition, studying the Minister’s leadership attributes showed that he was 
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predominantly policy-oriented. At the same time, Riester failed to pay due attention to consensus-
building with all relevant critics, including the trade unions and his left-wing opponents within the 
SPD. His failure to engage in comprehensive consensus-building suggested an addition to the IL 
concept in terms of further refining it, more specifically, adding an aspect dealing with  “efforts at 
political consensus-building”. From the Minister’s perspective, his neglect to build stable bridges with 
important reform critics complicated the course of the reform process, but, essentially, could not stop 
it.  
In sum, the first case delivered evidence for both IL and concession-making. By 
demonstrating the presence of an IL-type policy-maker, Minister of Labour Riester, it underlined the 
plausibility of the IL hypothesis. The Minister proved successful in pushing through the innovation of 
an additional private pension pillar in order to save the traditional pay-as-you-go system. That 
innovation weakened the principle of securing former living standards without dismantling it 
completely. At the same time, Riester combined IL with concessions to reform opponents in order to 
realize his plans. This case also demonstrated that a successful re-definition of policy principles (under 
the condition of proximate elections) and verbal tackling of reform opponents may not be sufficient in 
getting a reform adopted; making material concessions also proved to be important.  
 
Unemployment Insurance   
The second case study focused on the process preceding the 2004 reform of unemployment and social 
assistance, known as “Hartz IV”. This structural reform broke with the status quo of a de facto three-
pillar system of German unemployment protection and provoked substantial debate on how to 
effectively deal with mass unemployment. The evidence collected established that the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Labour Clement had acted in accordance with the criteria of ideational 
leadership during the reform process. In addition, his endeavour was aided by Chancellor Schröder 
and the Hartz commission, an ad hoc body of expert advisors. While Clements' performance was 
undoubtedly important, it was a combination of argumentation and concessions that allowed “Hartz 
IV” to materialise: IL was shown to have been a necessary but insufficient condition for structural 
reform.  
The analysis of the effects of IL highlighted the importance of the Minister’s leadership, 
confirming that it was crucial to break with traditional ways of thinking in labour market policy and to 
move an ambitious reform plan closer to decision point. Yet, IL alone was not sufficient, but 
Clements’ relentless effort in combination with the government’s willingness to achieve a compromise 
on implementation matters (not least to prove the government’s capacity to pass reforms) led to its 
adoption. The communication of this reform-minded and results-oriented Minister was essential for 
keeping the momentum in the reform process and for pushing the parliamentary opposition towards 
the conclusion of the reform. Despite the efforts by the reformist Clement to bring about a mentality 
change in tackling long-term unemployment, the reform was not concluded until the criticism of the 
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parliamentary opposition, concerning the role of local governments and the Länder in the Bundesrat, 
was accommodated. Instead of adopting Ministry’s “centralistic” solution (with the Federal 
Employment Agency as responsible actor), the compromise foresaw a split of administrative 
competences between local consortia and a number of local authorities, and the division of financing 
responsibilities concerning the new benefit.  
In his mission to move the reform plans towards completion, Clement could rely on the 
political commitment Chancellor Schröder, who also provided a general framework for social and 
economic policy reform. Moreover, he could draw upon the preparatory work carried out by the 
advisory Hartz commission. Clement’s willingness and ability to achieve a compromise proved crucial 
in ensuring that the core of the reform was adopted (even though the final result differed from the 
initial government concept), and it helped immensely to uphold the government’s image as being 
capable of pushing through important reforms.  
Echoing the findings of the pension case, the second case revealed that IL, in combination 
with concession-making (and to a lesser extent strategies that circumvent reform opposition), led to 
the adoption of a structural reforms, the Hartz IV reform, which eventually resulted in a strengthened 
principle of activation (“Fördern und Fordern”) for unemployment policy. The mix of federal, regional 
and local authorities involved in the process made for conflicting interests of reform stakeholders and 
forced the Minister to resort to concessions. Eventually, this enabled a compromise on how and at 
what state level (federal versus local) the new policy instruments should be administered. Nonetheless, 
the policy outcome owed much to Minister Clement’s strong display of IL, aided by Schröder and the 
Hartz commission.  
 
Health Care   
The third case evaluated the skills of an IL-type politician in the field of health care policy. The choice 
of “presumed” ideational leader Minister Seehofer was based on a short expert survey and an 
additional criterion that gauged the scope of initial policy ideas of several Ministers. The study 
focussed on two major reforms during his period in office, the 1992 Structural Health Reform Act 
(GSG) and the 1997 Health Care Reorganization Acts (1. and 2. GKV-NOG).  
The first reform aimed to control health care costs through the imposition of budgeting on 
various care providers; and introduced an organizational reform affecting sickness fund membership 
(free choice of sickness fund for patients) and relations between insurers (introduction redistributive 
risk-adjustment scheme to spread insurance risks). It was structural due to its changes in the sphere of 
regulation. The state reaffirmed its regulatory power vis-à-vis the self-administration bodies and 
interest groups and the market gained ground in a formerly static and state-regulated system through 
sickness fund reform. The rapid conclusion of the reform stemmed from Seehofer’s attempt to strike a 
deal with the Social Democrats. His new approach looking at how to deal with health care 
stakeholders and his fast and determined way of acting also speeded up the reform project. Moreover, 
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his distinctive and determined style of legitimizing the aims of the GSG, cost containment and 
structural reform (of sickness funds), proved effective. The Minister’s dual goal of stabilizing the 
statutory health insurance while opening it up to competition, while spreading the burdens amongst all 
relevant stakeholders, was convincing and withstood the protest of care providers. The resulting 
reform reflected Seehofer’s commitment to change the unfavourable state of the health care scheme, 
his ability to legitimize a bold reform concept, and the will and skill to overcome reform resistance, 
confirming the choice for the Minister as “presumed” ideational leader.  
The 1997 reform package aimed to limit contribution rates by linking them to increases in co-
payments and increased sickness fund choice for those insured. Moreover, these laws considerably 
increased patients’ co-payments, strengthened the financial liability of sickness funds, and extended 
the competences of self-governance bodies. Moreover, patients’ rights were strengthened, the hospital 
sector faced financial stability regulations, and dentists faced new remuneration rules. The 
Reorganization Acts were less far-reaching in scope than the GSG and perceived by critics as one-
sided, overstating the personal responsibility of patients and the liability of sickness funds to contain 
costs. Although their provisions altered the regulation structure of the SHI, they reversed former 
provisions on self-governance, making it difficult to compare them to truly innovative structural 
reforms. Minister Seehofer had to operate in an unfavourable, policy-making climate compared to the 
GSG. Having restored closer relations with interest groups, and after a failed attempt at taking the 
opposition on board, he tried to push the reform through despite considerable resistance from the 
Social Democrats and the Länder. Due to clear instructions by Chancellor Kohl to cut costs without 
alienating health care providers, the Minister’s leeway to continue with structural reforms had shrunk 
considerably. Seehofer failed to organize the necessary support for a more far-reaching reform and 
was unable to sell the resulting reform proposal as a logically consistent and well-balanced plan. 
Although the Minister did display some characteristics of IL in the process, its effects were surely 
limited and the reform outcome can hardly be described as a clear-cut structural shift. In a nutshell, 
Seehofer’s ability to promote and legitimise these reforms did not lead to visible results, as it seemed 
to be detained by the substantive content of the reform that put greater burdens on patients than on 
care providers. Moreover, his attempts at consensus-building ran aground and were restricted in their 
scope, due amongst other things to the lack of political backing by the Chancellor.  
The analysis found clear differences between reform outcomes, the processes, and the 
Minister’s role. In 1992, Seehofer clearly displayed IL in the run-up to the Health Restructuring Act, 
re-ordering the financial regulation and insurance function of sickness funds. Conversely, IL played a 
less prominent (and effective) role concerning the second reform plan in 1996/1997. The 
Reorganization Acts, although representing a structural shift in the regulatory dimension of health 
care, reversed earlier provisions and produced a controversial and short-lived outcome. The third case 
indicates that the effects of IL may be contingent, leading to structural reform in one case, and to a less 
clear-cut reform outcome in another. Moreover, it underlines that sector-specific features may be 
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consequential for the ease of reform adoption: in health care, the presence of strong stakeholders and 
diametrically opposed interests inevitably makes for strong opposition to comprehensive reforms from 
different sources. Under unfavourable circumstances, these may prove problematic for IL-type 
communication and behavioural patterns.   
 
 
 4. Interpreting the Findings  
 
Overall, the comparative case study provided evidence in favour of the IL hypothesis, as IL-type 
actors were identified in the first two cases on pension and unemployment reform. With regard to their 
assumed effectiveness, these cases also demonstrated that the same actors also had to resort to other 
strategies: IL alone did not shape the conditions for structural reforms. Instead, IL-type actors also 
resorted to concessions, as the reforms initiated by Riester and Clement indicated. Finally, the third 
case demonstrated that “presumed” IL Seehofer operated effectively in one reform process, while 
running into difficulties in another. The bottom line of the three analyses is that there is empirical 
backing for the IL concept. IL-type leaders do indeed exist in empirical reality and their actions do 
matter. Furthermore, the observations on the effects of IL point to a number of conditions which offer 
interesting prospects for further research.  
 
Implications for Studying Welfare State Change  
 
What do the affirmative empirical findings about IL imply for the historical institutional perspective 
on welfare states and their politics? Are these theories in need of modification to accommodate 
political agency and ideas? Or should the IL framework be seen as their complement, to help 
explaining empirical instances they cannot elucidate? I believe that the answer is yes to both questions. 
These theories are still useful to welfare state analysts as they offer credible explanations for why 
welfare state regimes tend to change incrementally or why (some) policy-makers shy away from 
unpopular reforms. Undoubtedly, electoral reasons or institutional characteristics, as Pierson originally 
contended, still explain instances where far-reaching reform has not come off the ground. At the same 
time, however, these theories need to supply explanations for far-reaching reform, if they seek to 
explain more recent empirical welfare state developments, or need to be complemented by new 
theories of welfare state transformation.8 The case studies have produced a number of conditions 
                                                
8
 For instance, Esping-Andersen’s regime theory would explain more if it specified conditions under which reforms other 
than incremental ones may happen. This might include stating how and under what conditions reforms might transform 
welfare states by introducing features of other regimes over time (e.g. by shifting responsibilities and competences within 
policies, as implied by structural reforms). Equally, Pierson’s “new politics” account would benefit if it not only specified 
that politicians tend to shy away from potentially unpopular reforms and at best engage in patterns of blame-avoidance. It 
would also need to spell out how the same politicians might proactively promote such reforms, as the theoretical framework 
of IL does. Thus, IL is a valuable complement to the literature of welfare state politics, as it sheds light on such patterns of 
reform promotion. 
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impacting upon the relationship between IL and structural reform, which are relevant for patterns of 
welfare state transformation.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Summary of additional restrictions on/opportunities for IL-type policy-makers  
 
Returning to the relevance for theorizing welfare state change, the combined findings on the IL 
hypothesis and its conditions are extending the “new politics” argument, which claimed that the 
politics of retrenching welfare states differs fundamentally from the politics of extending them 
(Pierson 1996). Importantly, the conditions for IL arose from studying reforms that were not 
examples for retrenchment (for which politicians allegedly pursue defensive blame-avoidance 
strategies), but which were associated with restructuring, prompting politicians to promote them as 
innovative proposals. This strongly suggests that contemporary processes of welfare state 
restructuring differ from those leading to retrenchment. Spelling out how politicians might tackle 
major and potentially controversial reforms questions important assumptions of “new politics”, 
specifically, the unpopularity of reforms and the character of policy-makers as office-seekers who 
fear electoral hazard. On the basis of German reform patterns, the argument can be made that reforms 
that involve restructuring and recalibration of policies are not unpopular per se.10 Moreover, policy-
makers did not behave as mere office-seekers. On the contrary, they showed an active interest in the 
substance of policy and were not put off in the first place by potential electoral losses (whether their 
ulterior motives were also office-seeking cannot be ruled out, but this remains an empirical question).  
In short, I found that the politics of transforming welfare states are different from the politics 
of retrenching welfare states, which could be observed during the 1990’s. In order to explain welfare 
state reform in the early 21st century, analysts need to rethink their assumptions and analytical tools. 
                                                
9
 These additional conditions largely differ from earlier work on the politics of retrenchment (Pierson 1996), whether one 
looks at factors assumed to obstruct reform (electoral hazard, “status quo-ness”, organized interests, path-dependent effects) 
or to present opportunities for retrenchment (electoral slack, budgetary crisis, changing the rules of the game, potential for 
hiding reforms through blame-avoidance strategies). Most of these conditions, As for the other points, restricting and 
enabling conditions on reformist politicians differ considerably from past thinking on obstacles to and opportunities for 
retrenchment. The only overlapping elements are the conditions with respect to elections and crisis, which in the present 
study were found to restrict the prospects for structural reform, but, in Pierson’s opinion, facilitated retrenchment. Strictly 
speaking, the condition on crisis perception is close to the first aspect of IL, “rejecting the status quo”. However, with the 
second health care reform, a general perception of economic crisis (not restricted to the status quo in the health care sector) 
became synonymous with the imperative to effect cost-savings and prevented Seehofer from continuing with structural 
reforms rather than helping him. 
10
 Admittedly, restructuring may also include unpopular measures (for instance, the merger of benefits implied by the Hartz 
IV reform also included substantial and potentially unpopular benefit cuts that were feared by important actors in the 
process), but the presence of IL-type actors who explain and defend the necessity of reforms may redress the popular 
appearance of reforms as painful cutbacks of social security provision. 
• proximity/distance of key election data  
• financial/economic crisis perception imposed on reformists/used by reformists  
• relative proximity/distance of party-political positions on reform 
• lack of backing/backing by head of government 
• absence/presence of catalytic effect by external actors   
• low/high degree of fairness in how reform burdens are spread among 
stakeholders  
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Moreover, as Pierson has aptly recognised in his more recent work, welfare state restructuring occurs 
according to different political dynamics in different welfare state regimes (Pierson 2001). In this line 
of reasoning, reforms in Social Democratic or Liberal regimes may follow a different logic than in 
Continental regimes. The IL framework has made a step towards disclosing the reform logic of this 
pre-eminently resilient regime by stressing the role of individual actors in contrast to Pierson’s “new 
middle coalition” (2001: 452).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum up, this paper has addressed the puzzle of major welfare state reforms in the German context.  
It has proposed that key policy-makers with attributes of ideational leadership (IL) facilitate structural 
reforms by changing policy stakeholders’ policy preferences and gathering support for their policy 
ideas. The evidence from a comparative study of four reforms showed that policy-makers indeed 
displayed IL. In addition, they resorted to concession-making to overcome political-institutional 
obstacles to reform adoption. One conclusion to draw is that the politics of transforming welfare 
states, in contrast to retrenching them, offers opportunities for political agency to shape policy 
outcomes, within certain contextual conditions.  
Moreover, the paper has taken up a number of themes that are pertinent to the larger debate on 
policy change and deserve highlighting. First, it has offered a new answer to what drives policy 
change, and, by extension, on what level(s) its analysis should take place. The concept of ideational 
leadership (IL) specifies a novel driver of change, based on the combination of political agency and 
their policy ideas, defined in terms of communicative and behavioural patterns that lend themselves to 
empirical investigation. IL provides fresh input into the conceptual debate on what best explains 
changes in public policy and political order: ideas, interests or - perhaps - both (Majone 1996; 
Lieberman 2002; Starke 2006). In addition, IL is situated at a level of analysis that has been little 
considered in existing research: the micro- or individual actor level. Departing from the observation 
that meso- and macro-level explanations cannot explain change satisfactorily in the German context, it 
was shown how a micro-level explanation may be linked to policy change measured at the meso- (or 
policy programme) level.  
Second, the paper has dealt with the question of how to operationalize and assess policy 
change. Major change in a social policy context can be measured by focusing on the main structural 
dimensions of a policy programme (regarding finance, benefit and regulation structures), and shifts 
within these dimensions can be characterized as structural reform. Depicting major change as shifts in 
the structural dimensions of a policy provides an extra dimension to existing theories of policy change, 
which often rely on concepts of path-dependency and departure. This focus makes it more likely to 
detect policy changes that cover the middle ground between frequent incremental policy adjustments 
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and rarely occurring paradigmatic changes. In addition, the study contributes to the debate on the 
temporal dimension of significant change. It does so by suggesting that structural reforms are the 
result of gradually evolving and lengthy reform processes, even when the object of study are 
individual reforms. One reason for this may be difficulties to get reform ideas on political agendas, as 
well as the gradual character of learning and acceptance processes of opposing actors, which supposed 
IL-type policy-makers are supposed to encourage. 
As a final note, IL has been geared to the specific context of change in welfare states with its 
high degree of institutional resilience and strong vested interests. Surely, social policy is not the only 
domain of public policy where political agency might break up institutional obstacles to change. The 
IL proposition may be usefully applied to other policy areas where major changes have been observed 
despite strong path dependencies, policy legacies and stakeholders. Examples that come to mind are, 
for instance, agricultural, environmental, energy, or gender equality policy. It might take an innovative 
leader in agricultural policy to carry out subsidization reform against powerful farmers and bio-
industry lobbies who want to keep current subsidy structures. Far-reaching changes in policy on 
environmental and energy issues (and most recently, climate protection policy) may just take 
innovation-minded politicians. In these policy fields, politicians confront well-organized lobbies that 
defend traditional energy sources or represent energy-consuming and polluting means of transport (air 
travel, car industries). Explaining significant changes in these areas would be facilitated by an actor-
centred approach along the lines of IL. Gender equality policy may serve as a final example. Large 
steps forward on this policy terrain (for instance, the adoption of guidelines on gender mainstreaming) 
to enhance women’s chances and career possibilities on the labour market typically meet with 
resistance of ministerial bureaucrats or conservative trade unions who fear legal interventions as 
attacks on well-established competences. However, this list is not exhaustive and other instances of 
large-scale change in areas of public policy that defy such change, could be added. 
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